limitation Act Art. 164
“(4) In Pundlick Rowji v. Vasantrao Madhavrao, (1909) 11 Bom LR 1296 Davar, J., held that the expression “knowledge of the decree” in Art. 164 means knowledge not of a decree but of the particular decree which is sought to be set aside, a certain and clear perception of the fact that the particular decree had been passed against him. On the facts of that case, Davar, J., held that a notice to the defendant that a decree had been passed against him in the High Court suit No. 411 of 1909 in favour of one Pund- lick Rowji with whom he had no dealings was not sufficient to impute to him clear knowledge of the decree in the absence of any information that the decree had been passed in favour of Pundlick Rowji as the assignee of a promissory note which he had executed in favour of another party. This case was followed by the Calcutta High Court in Kumud Nath Roy Chowdhury v. Jotindra Nath Chowdhury, (1911) ILR 38 Cal 394 at p. 403. In Bapurao Sitaram Kar- markar v. Sadbu Bhiva Gholap, ILR 47 Bom 485: (AIR 1923 Bom 193) the Bombay High f Court held that the evidence of two persons t who had been asked by the plaintiff to te the defendant about the decree and to settle the matter was not sufficient to impose knowledge of the decree on the defendant within the meaning of Art. 164. C. J., said: Macleod,
“We think the words of the article mean something more than mere knowledge that a decree had been passed in some suit in some Court against the applicant. We think it means that the applicant must have knowledge not merely that a decree has been passed by some Court against him, but that a particular decree has been passed to against him in a particular Court in favour of a particular person for a particular sum. A judgment- debtor is not in such a favour able position as he used to be when he had thirty days from the time when execution was levied against him. But we do not think that the Legislature meant to go to the other extreme by laying down that time began to run from the time the judgment- debtor might have received some vague information that a decree had been passed against him.”
This decision was followed in Batulan v. S. K. Dwivedi, (1954) ILR 33 Pat 1025 at pp. 1050-8 and other cases. We agree that the expression “knowledge of the decree” in Art. 164 means knowledge of the particular decree which is sought to be set aside. When the summons was not duly served, limitation under Art. 164 does not start running against the defendant because he has received some vague information that some decree has been passed against him. It is a question of fact in each case whether the information conveyed to the defendant is sufficient to impute to him knowledge of the decree within the meaning of Art. 164. The test of the sufficiency is not what the information would mean to a stranger, but what it meant to the defendant in the light of his previous dealings with the plaintiff and the facts and circumstances known to him. If from the information conveyed to him the defendant has knowledge of the decree sought to be set aside, time begins to run against him under Art. 164.. It is not necessary that a copy of the decree should be served on the defendant. It is sufficient that the defendant has knowledge of the material facts concerning the decree, so that he has a clear perception of the injury suffered by him and can take effective steps to set aside the decree.”
